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Resumo
Para Além da Bomba: Indutores Não-Militares 
das Ambições Nucleares Iranianas
Este artigo analisa o dilema da desconfiança pre-
sente no conflito que incide sobre o programa 
nuclear do Irão. A tendência para ver as intenções 
do outro lado à luz do pior cenário possível contri-
buiu para a fixação Ocidental face a uma bomba 
nuclear iraniana, deixando pouco espaço para 
explicações alternativas. Este artigo argumenta que 
a ausência de uma consideração séria pelas motiva-
ções não-militares por detrás das ambições nuclea-
res do Irão tem inibido a compreensão sobre a des-
confiança que existe neste país face às intenções 
dos Estados Unidos da América, tornando mais 
difícil de abordar as preocupações iranianas. Ava-
liações céticas sobre as intenções do Irão também 
contribuíram para o perigo de profecias negativas, 
dado que aumentam a probabilidade de ação mili-
tar e reforçam a necessidade do Irão em manter em 
aberto a opção de desenvolver uma dissuasão 
nuclear. Para além de tentar demonstrar a pers-
petiva iraniana, o artigo reflete também sobre o 
dilema de confiança oriundo da perspetiva Oci-
dental, aplicando perceções de psicologia politica. 
Por fim, analisa como a alegada inevitável espiral 
de desconfiança mútua começou a ser revertida em 
2013, e considera as perspetivas para um acordo 
abrangente.
Abstract
This article analyses the dilemma of mistrust in the con-
flict over Iran’s nuclear program. The related tendency 
to view the other side’s intentions in the worst possible 
light has contributed to the Western fixation with the 
Iranian bomb, leaving little room for alternative expla-
nations. Here it is argued that the lack of serious atten-
tion to the non-military drivers of Iran’s nuclear ambi-
tions has inhibited understanding of the country’s 
respective lack of trust in US intentions, thus making it 
harder to address Iranian concerns. Cynical assess-
ments of Iran’s intentions have also contributed to the 
danger of self-fulfilling prophesy by increasing the like-
lihood of military action and thus highlighting Iran’s 
need to keep open the option of developing a nuclear 
deterrent. In addition to shedding light on the Iranian 
perspective, the article reflects on the dilemma of trust 
from the Western perspective, applying insights from 
political psychology. It also looks at how the seemingly 
inescapable downward spiral of mutual mistrust began 
to be reversed in 2013, and considers the prospects for a 
comprehensive deal.
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Introduction
The dispute over Iran’s nuclear program has for the most part seemed to defy all 
attempts at diplomatic solution. The crisis began to unfold in 2002 and it escalated 
particularly since 2006, with Iran stepping up its controversial uranium enrichment 
program and the other side imposing sanctions and issuing military threats. Reflec-
ting a persistent Western tendency to take Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions for 
granted, many at the time saw sanctions as the only alternative to ‘an Iranian bomb 
or the bombing of Iran’ (Sarkozy, 2007).
However, the more recent diplomatic progress in the nuclear talks between Iran 
and the five permanent Security Council members and Germany (the so-called 
P5+1) suggests that that the previous interpretation of the situation was based on 
overly cynical assumptions. In this article it is argued that such assumptions, as 
well as the related tendency to ignore the non-military motivations behind Iran’s 
nuclear program, have inhibited understanding of Iran’s respective lack of trust in 
Western intentions. It thus starts from the assumption that the problem of mistrust 
in the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program is mutual, and that tackling of this pro-
blem has only become possible when each side are serious about acknowledging 
and addressing the other’s key concerns. Insights from political psychology are 
applied to understand the related diplomatic challenges. The article also looks at 
how the dynamics of mistrust began to be reversed in 2013, explaining the positive 
change largely in terms of increasing Western sensitivity to Iranian concerns.
While also engaging with the Western suspicions about Iranian intentions, the arti-
cle mainly seeks to shed light on the less-known Iranian concerns and on how they 
explain the country’s insistence in maintaining its uranium enrichment program. 
The starting point here is that any speculation about Iranian intentions is prone to 
misperception without a genuine attempt to understand the country’s nuclear 
poli cy on its own terms. In addition to the dynamics of mistrust, prestige and mili-
tary considerations are also seen to explain Iranian nuclear policy. While this article 
therefore does not deny that there is a military rationale behind Iran’s nuclear pro-
gram, this is not regarded as the predominant driver of that program. Furthermore, 
when highlighting the role of prestige in connection with the nuclear dispute, this 
is linked with Iran’s quest for nuclear self-sufficiency and the need to save face in 
the nuclear confrontation, rather than the standard association between prestige 
and nuclear weapons.
The paper begins with a background discussion, recalling key events in the dispute 
over Iran’s nuclear program. It then discusses the non-military rationales behind 
the country’s nuclear ambitions, highlighting mistrust and prestige considerations. 
This is followed by an explanation for the Western suspicions and the related lack 
of attention to Iranian concerns. The next part, in turn, explains the recent diplomat ic 
success in terms of an increasing hopes regarding the possibility of a mutually 
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acceptable end goal. The paper ends with an identification of obstacles that conti-
nue to cast a shadow on the prospects of a comprehensive solution.
Background
Although the US and Israel had suspected Iran of having had a secret nuclear 
weapons program since early 1990s (Peterson, 2011), the current international dis-
pute started only in 2002, with revelations about undeclared nuclear activities in 
the country. In 2003 Iran admitted that it had an undeclared uranium-enrichment 
facility and a heavy-water reactor. Although the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
does not prohibit its members from having such facilities, the fact that Iran had not 
reported them, as well as experiments on enrichment, was seen to go against the 
country’s obligations. While the US argued that this constituted noncompliance 
with the NPT and called for an immediate referral to the UN Security Council, the 
Europeans preferred the route of negotiation.
In May 2003, Iran made the US a secret offer for comprehensive bilateral negotia-
tions—proposing to address not only the nuclear but also other major issues of 
concern between the two countries that had been at odds since the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution. However, the offer was turned down by the Bush administration, 
which had recently placed Iran on its ‘axis of evil’ (Parsi, 2007: 248). In effect, the 
UK, France, and Germany (the so-called EU3) began to pursue the negotiations 
with Iran. They reached a deal whereby Iran agreed to suspend its uranium enrich-
ment activities for the duration of the negotiations, to allow extensive inspections, 
and to resolve outstanding issues related to with past undeclared activities with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The EU3 for their part, in a Commu-
nication on November 26, 2004, committed themselves to providing Iran with 
“guarantees on nuclear, technological and economic cooperation and firm commit-
ments on security issues”. Absent US involvement, however, the EU was hardly in 
a position to deliver the proposed incentives. At the same time, the 2005 presiden-
tial elections in Iran created pressure to show that the enrichment program had not 
been completely halted. In March Iran came up with a proposal whereby it would 
freeze industrial-scale enrichment while beginning “enrichment with five hundred 
centrifuges at its pilot plant”, under close monitoring by the IAEA (ElBaradei, 2011: 
144). By this time, however, the EU3 had moved closer to the US position that there 
should be “not one centrifuge running in Iran” (ElBaradei; 2011: 192-195), leaving 
little common ground to continue negotiations.
In effect, Iran resumed the suspended activities, and the Europeans finally gave 
their support to the finding of non-compliance and referral to the UN Security 
Council involvement (Sauer 2007). The Security Council issued a Presidential State-
ment on March 29, 2006, calling for Iran to “take the steps […] which are essential 
to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear program”. 
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While Russia and the IAEA chief still proposed that Iran be allowed to run limited 
enrichment operations, President Bush argued that Iran “can’t be trusted with 
enrichment” because “enriching uranium is a step toward having a nuclear 
weapon” (Bush, 2008). Combined with Iran’s insistence on its right to enrichment, 
this position effectively ruled out any further negotiations.
In 2006 the P5+1 took over the nuclear diplomacy with Iran, although in practice 
there were no talks until mid-2008 due to the US precondition that Iran first sus-
pend its nuclear activities. Diplomacy thus meant pressuring Iran to accept the June 
2006 package of proposals, which promised negotiations on various incentives if 
Iran would agree to suspension, address outstanding issues, and accept more intru-
sive inspections. Given Iran’s refusal to comply, the Security Council issued its first 
resolution on the country in July 2006, followed by several rounds of sanctions 
starting in December 2006.
The inauguration of President Obama lead to first serious talks in October 2009. 
Rather than the demand for suspension, the talks focused on a confidence-building 
deal whereby Iran would send most of its low-enriched uranium (LEU) abroad for 
reprocessing, and receive highly enriched uranium in return. The failure of this first 
confidence-building attempt - together with Iran’s subsequent announcement that 
it had started enriching up to 20 per cent - led to the fourth UN sanctions resolution. 
This was followed by unprecedentedly harsh US and EU sanctions on Iran’s C entral 
Bank and oil industry in 2011-2012. The fruitless negotiations in 2012 and spring 
2013 focused mainly on Iran’s enrichment up to 20 percent and at Fordo.
The election of Hassan Rouhani as Iran’s new President in summer 2013 brought 
about an unprecedented exchange of reconciliatory gestures between Tehran and 
Washington. The subsequent talks that began in October led to an unprecedented 
breakthrough on 24 November 2013, as the parties agreed on interim deal known 
as the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA). The deal, which is to be followed by a com-
prehensive agreement, involves restriction and enhanced monitoring of Iran’s 
nuclear activities and limited sanctions relief by the P5+1. More specifically, under 
the agreement Iran has committed itself to freezing uranium enrichment and 
neutra lizing the stockpile of uranium enriched up to 20 percent Tehran also prom-
ised to refrain from installing and using additional centrifuges and to open up its 
nuclear facilities to daily inspections. In addition to the previous offer of sanctions 
relief on gold, metals and petrochemicals as well as spare parts and repairs for 
Iran’s civilian aircraft, the P5+1 concessions also included the US suspension of 
sanctions on Iran’s auto industry and partial unfreezing of Iranian assets abroad 
(Joint Plan of Action, 2013)
Initially a six-month confidence-building process, the JPOA has been extended 
twice in July and November 2014. The current deadline for a comprehensive agree-
ment is in June 2015. In parallel with the search for a political agreement, Iran and 
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the IAEA are working to resolve outstanding issues concerning the potential mili-
tary dimensions (PMD) of activities that took place prior to 2003. The IAEA’s ability 
to reach a ‘broad conclusion’ on this issue is undermined by its lack of expertise in 
weaponization (Rauf and Kelley, 2014) and Iran’s reluctance to give out sensitive 
information (Dahl, 2014).
The Non-Military Rationales behind Iran’s Nuclear Policy: Mistrust and Prestige
Like many other countries, Iran relies on nuclear energy to meet growing energy 
needs and to release more oil for exports. It also uses the technology for medical, 
agricultural and other industrial purposes. Unlike most others, however, Iran has 
also decided to enrich uranium, thus seeking to produce its own nuclear fuel. This 
choice lies at the core of the nuclear dispute, as enriched uranium could also be 
diverted to military use. Proliferation concerns about this duel use technology have 
been enforced by the country’s previous lack of transparency and claims about 
PMD. While the IAEA is still struggling to verify the accuracy of related evidence, 
US intelligence agencies have concluded that Iran had a nuclear weapons program 
until 2003. That they also concluded that halted that program and “is less deter-
mined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging” (National Intelli-
gence Estimate, 2007) further highlights the need to understand which rationales, 
apart from the military ones, explain Iranian nuclear policy.
The Need for Civilian Nuclear Energy
When Iran’s nuclear program started in the 1970s, it received broad Western sup-
port. At the time, key US administration officials not only “endorsed Iranian plans 
to build a massive nuclear energy industry, but also worked hard to complete a […] 
deal that would have given Tehran control of large quantities of plutonium and 
enriched uranium”. In 1976, the US President also signed a directive that allowed 
Iran to have a complete nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment. The 
rationale was to help Iran “prepare against the time […] when Iranian oil produc-
tion is expected to decline sharply” (Linzer, 2005).
The civilian logic behind Iran’s nuclear program have remained unchanged until 
this day, with the distinction that energy needs have grown. Since the 1970s, Iran’s 
population has doubled, leading to increased consumption and what a 2009 IAEA 
report calls “an incremental trend of energy intensity”. The same report states that, 
due to “the limitation of the existing technologies […], it is not expected that 
renewable[s] play a major role in Iran’s electricity system in near future”, making 
the nuclear option as “the most competitive to fossil alternatives” (IAEA Country 
Nuclear Power Profiles/Iran, 2009)
In line with these assessments, the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on 4 November 
2005, has argued that “[w]e want some of our unrenewable resources to remain for 
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the coming generations” and “[w]e do not want our country to run out of oil over 
the next 20 or 25 years”. Khamenei, on 9 March 2006, also said that, “in today’s 
world, scientific strength is key to economic and political strength”, and if Iran 
“fails to possess a nuclear energy-generated power system, it will face with many 
problems”.
The Quest for Nuclear Self-Sufficiency
Although Iran’s civilian nuclear energy needs are rarely disputed today, this was 
not always the case. After the 1979 revolution, the US reversed from its previous 
policy of supporting Iran’s nuclear program to undermining attempts to develop it 
further. As a result, Iran’s requests for cooperation with previous Western partners 
were refused, or cooperation soon ended. For example, a Spanish company with 
whom Iran signed a deal to complete the construction of the Bushehr power plant 
cancelled the plans, referring to US pressure and proliferation concerns. Ultimately, 
Russia was left as Iran’s lone nuclear partner in finishing the construction the coun-
try’s first power reactor, based on a deal made in 1995 (Koch and Wolf, 1998) As for 
the clandestine development of uranium enrichment technology, in this effort Iran 
received crucial assistance from A. Q. Khan’s network (IAEA, 2004).
Iranian officials have argued that the development of nuclear fuel production 
capacity, as well as the need to do this in secret, had to do with the difficulties in 
accessing the international nuclear market (Zarif 2007: 81-82). Adding to this expe-
rience were the delays in the reactor construction and subsequent fuel shipments 
from Russia in the 2000s. Although Russia explained the delays in terms technical 
difficulties, they seem to have been part of a collusion whereby Russia, in Garth 
Porter’s words, agreed “to squeeze Iran on its nuclear policy” in exchange for 
“political-military concessions from the United States”. He further argues that “[t]
he experience with Russia… hardened Iran’s determination to be self-reliant in 
nuclear fuel fabrication” (Porter, 2014a)
Paradoxically, the US relaxed its previous position at the start of the current crisis 
in early 2000s: instead of opposing any kind of a nuclear program, it began to 
argue that Iran should not enrich uranium. As President Bush said, on June 19, 
2006, the desire of Iranian people “to make... greater progress, including the 
development of civilian nuclear energy... is a legitimate desire” but adding up in 
July 4, 2008, they “can’t be trusted with enrichment”. For Iran, however, giving 
up enrichment-related activities would have meant perpetuating the country’s 
dependence on unreliable foreign partners and thus risking the entire program. 
As written in Iran’s response to the P5+1 package of proposals in June 6, 2006, “[r]
epeated breaches and noncompliance by European countries and the United 
States of their undertakings under the NPT as well as their contractual obliga-
tions in cooperation and transfer of technology […] and lack of international 
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guarantees in non-interrupted provision of fuel has left no option except to move 
to produce part of the required fuel domestically.
Although Iran has overcome a major technological hurdle by succeeding in u ranium 
enrichment, it should be noted that this has not yet made the country self-reliant in 
fuel production. The process includes the likewise complicated task of turning LEU 
into fuel assemblies which Iran has yet to master. The only functioning power reac-
tor in Bushehr, as well as the additional ones that Russia agreed to build in Novem-
ber 2014, thus rely on Russian fuel. Iran nevertheless hopes to be able to master the 
manufacturing of fuel assemblies in the near future (Porter, 2014b).
Iranian View of Suspension as the Goal, Rather than Means to Negotiation
While Iran has made clear that it will not give up enrichment, the country’s position 
regarding the suspension of related activities has varied depending on political 
circums tances. As noted above, Iran was more forthcoming during the talks with 
the EU3 (and in the context of the current talks under the JPOA). In retrospect, 
ho wever, Iranian officials referred to their experience with the EU3 as yet another 
factor enforcing their suspicions about the other side’s intentions. In December 23, 
2006 and according to the current Iranian foreign minister and nuclear negotiator 
Javad Zarif, the reason why the talks with the EU3 went nowhere was that “the 
United States, and apparently the EU3 - in spite of what they told us” wanted “a 
binding commitment [for Iran] not to pursue fuel cycle activities”. Khamenei, in 
turn, explained that he had to personally put on end to the [Iran-EU3] process 
because, if Iran’s “retreats had continued… today there would be no nuclear 
advances and no scientific dynamism and innovation in the country” (Khamenei, 
24 July, 2012).
The suspension of enrichment became a red line particularly after it was made 
legally binding through the first UN Security Council resolution. Iran rejected the 
Council’s demands as both politically motivated and illegal, pointing out that 
ne ither uranium enrichment nor reprocessing are restricted by the NPT. From the 
Iranian perspective, it seemed that the other side was more interested in isolating 
and undermining the Iranian regime than solving the nuclear problem. (Khazaee, 
3 March, 2008). Instead of proliferation concerns, the key problem, from the pers-
pective of Khamenei, is the US opposition “to the identity […] influence and power 
of the Islamic Republic”, and by its desire to turn Iran into “a weak, abandoned, 
isolated, […] and humiliated nation” (Khamenei, 3 November, 2013). Reflective of 
the persistence of this suspicion in the context of the present diplomatic progress, 
Khamenei on February 8, 2014) also recently said that “American politicians […] 
would not hesitate even for a moment to destroy the foundation of the Islamic 
Republic” if they could. Such remarks highlight that the core problem in the 
nuclear confrontation is the conflict between the US and Iran. Although an 
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in-depth discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, the related 
dynamics of mistrust are discussed further ahead.
Prestige: Glorification of Resistance and Nuclear Self-Reliance
In the course of the nuclear confrontation with the West, Iran’s nuclear policy has 
become deeply aligned with national identity. As Homeira Moshirzadeh (2007: 
529-533) argues, this is illustrated by the prominence of the discourses of ‘inde-
pendence’, ‘justice’, and ‘resistance’ in the nuclear rhetoric. The discourse of indepen-
dence, she explains, is based on memories of the Persian Empire; ‘historical victimi-
zation by invaders’, and the more recent history of manipulation by Western 
powers. It is in the vocabulary of this discourse that Iran’s quest for nuclear self-
suffi ciency is articulated. Second, the discourse of justice derives partly from Iranian 
religious tradition, and partly from emancipatory ideals related to sovereign equal-
ity. It can be seen in the Iranian rejection of double standards and its appeals to its 
inalienable rights under the NPT. As for the third discourse of resistance, Moshirzade h 
(2007: 536-537) notes that it began to define the nuclear issue only after 2005, as 
radical conservatives came to dominate the domestic scene, and as international 
pressure on Iran increased. This discourse highlights Iran’s “non-sub missive iden-
tity” which does not surrender to pressure. It is therefore not surpri sing that it 
emergence coincided with the imposition of the UN Security Council resolutions. 
During this time, resistance to the P5+1 demands turned into a virtue in the Iranian 
rhetoric. Accordingly, the subsequent hardships came to be viewed as sacrifices 
that further highlighted the symbolic value of Iran’s nuclear achievements. At the 
same time, the nuclear dispute came to be framed as the latest manifestation of the 
old confrontation between the West and the Islamic Republic.1
The linkage between nuclear policy and national identity has obviously created 
political constraints limiting Iran’s ability to make concessions in the nuclear talks. 
As President Rouhani put it in September 19, 2013, “mastering the atomic fuel cycle 
and generating nuclear power is as much about diversifying our energy resources 
as it is about who Iranians are as a nation”. On the other hand, however, the same 
political constraints should also alleviate Western proliferation concerns: as part of 
the government’s efforts to rally domestic support and gain international recogni-
tion for its nuclear policy, Iran has taken a firm stand against nuclear weapons by 
repeatedly denouncing them as un-Islamic. For example, according to Wyn Bowen 
and Matthew Moran (2014: 40) the international pressure following the public 
exposure of Iran’s nuclear activities since 2002 “placed barriers in the way of pro-
1 As the former Foreign Minister Mottaki argued on March 24, 2007, “[j]ust as the Iranian nation 
paid a heavy price for the nationalization of its oil industry and its eight years of sacred defense, 
we realize that we must now be prepared to pay the price for our dignity and our independence”.
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gress towards the bomb”, as Iran was “forced to fully engage with the peaceful 
nuclear narrative at the domestic level”.
Western Fixation with the Bomb as Part of the Dynamics of Mistrust
Despite providing a sound alternative explanation for Iran’s nuclear policy, the 
above-discussed rationales are rarely given serious attention in Western assess-
ments on Iranian nuclear intentions. One reason for this is the historical amnesia 
about the past policy of technology denial, which is omitted from most accounts on 
the Iranian nuclear confrontation. This has led to an inclination to view the enrich-
ment program itself as sufficient evidence of nuclear weapons ambitions. Even 
when Iran’s bitter experiences with international nuclear partners are acknowled-
ged, however, they tend to be dismissed as a ‘cover story’ (Erästö, 2014).
Ultimately, the Western tendency to view Iran intentions in the worst possible light 
can be traced to the same root cause that explains Khamenei’s cynicism about US 
intentions: namely, the US-Iranian conflict. John Limbert (2009: 184 and 188), for 
example, has argued that, since the Iranian revolution, the US and Iranian percep-
tions of each other have been dominated by “mythology, distortion, grievance, and 
stereotype”. The mutual enmity has been perpetuated by domestic politics: as Trita 
Parsi (2012: 6) notes, “too many forces [both in the US and Iran] calculate that they 
can better advance their own narrow interests by retaining the status quo, or the 
predictability of enmity is preferred to the unpredictability of peace-making”.
The negative perceptions that dominate assessments of each side’s intentions can 
be conceptualized in terms of what political psychologists call a ‘cognitive’ and 
‘motivated’ bias. According to Robert Jervis (2006: 650-651), the former refers to the 
basic fact that “people tend to see what they expect to see”; they are predisposed to 
view a proposition as plausible when it is consistent with their more general beliefs, 
and that such “judgments of plausibility can be self-reinforcing”. Motivational bias, 
on the other hand, means that “[b]eliefs may be rationalizations for policies as well 
as rationales for them”. While Parsi’s above quote implies a calculated efforts to 
demonize the other to serve particular interests, the concept of motivated bias 
refers to the “hesitancy to recognize painful value trade-offs, the... need for people 
to see that their policies will work, the impact on beliefs of goals and feelings of 
which people are unaware, and the propensity of people to infer their own beliefs 
from how they behave” (Jervis, 2006: 652-653).
Jervis (1968: 458-459) also explains that “the dilemma of how ‘open’ to be to new 
information is particularly central in decision-makers’ attempts to estimate the 
intentions of other states”. That dilemma is even more pronounced when assess-
ing the intentions of adversaries, as actors “often feel they are ‘playing it safe’ to 
believe and act as though the other state were hostile in questionable cases” (Jervis, 
1968: 475). Similarly, Deborah Welch Larson (2004: 42) notes that in international 
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politics “[d]istrust is often prudent, given the high costs of being betrayed, uncer-
tainty about others’ motives, and material incentives to lie or cheat”. She also 
points to the difficulty of correcting misperceptions in such situations, as “[d]
istrust inhibits one from engaging in the very behavior that might disprove it”. 
Instead, “[b]eliefs that the other is untrustworthy color interpretation of his or her 
behavior”, which is likely to get interpreted in a way that supports the existing 
beliefs. (Larson, 2004: 44-45) Such avoidance of political risks arguably goes a long 
way in explaining both sides’ aversion to making significant concessions through-
out much of the nuclear confrontation.
There are nevertheless certain well-known dangers to misperception related with 
excessive mistrust, the most obvious being self-fulfilling prophesy: by basing their 
actions on the logic of mistrust, decision-makers themselves engage in behavior 
which is likely to be perceived as threatening by the potential adversary, who then 
responds in a negative way (Larson, 2004: 47). Indeed, one of the most worrying 
aspects of the nuclear dispute arguably is the threats of military action against 
Ir anian nuclear facilities that have been made based on a vague definition of what 
exactly would trigger such an attack: rather than preventing Iran’s nuclear advan-
cement, such a policy can be seen to have confirmed the wisdom of nuclear 
he dging2 from the Iranian perspective.
However, bearing in mind what was said above about domestic constraints, it is 
highly unlikely that Iran would embark on a crash nuclear weapons program 
unless as a last resort in a time of war. One must also keep in mind the international 
repercussions of ‘breakout’3, as this would trigger not only a military response, but 
also likely put an end with nuclear cooperation with Russia. Finally, as a country 
whose revenue largely relies on the export of oil, Iran can ill afford any further 
international isolation.
Cracking the Wall of Mistrust
This part, looks at how the seemingly inescapable downward spiral of mutual 
mistrust began to be reversed in 2013. The change is explained in terms of a learn-
ing process whereby both sides acknowledged the need to reduce ambiguity about 
their own intentions.
2 Ariel Levite (2002) quoted in Bowen and Moran (2014) defines hedging is a “strategy of main-
taining, or… appearing to maintain, a viable option for the relatively rapid acquisition of 
nuclear weapons, based on an indigenous technical capacity” to do so.
3  Although breakout is often used to refer to the time it would take to produce enough nuclear 
material for a nuclear bomb, Rauf and Kelley (2014) point out that traditionally it has meant “a 
sudden and unexpected move that gives [a state] a strategic advantage”.
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Failure of ‘Confidence-Building’ until Spring 2013
As noted before, in 2009 the diplomatic track was added to what had until then 
been an exclusively coercive approach by the P5+1. In line with Obama’s campaign 
pledge to negotiate with Iran ‘without preconditions’, the P5+1 implicitly with-
drew from previous demands regarding suspension and focused on limiting Iran’s 
production and stockpiles of enriched uranium. The opportunity for this arose with 
Iran’s request to the IAEA for higher enriched fuel that the country needed for 
medical purposes. In effect, the US, Russia, France, and the IAEA (the so-called 
Vienna group) proposed that 1200 kg of the Iranian LEU would be shipped to 
Ru ssia for further enrichment, and then sent to France to be turned into fuel.
Despite the promising beginning, no agreement was eventually reached. In con-
trast to the original understanding that all LEU be removed at once, in the second 
meeting Iranians, appealing to their “lack of trust and their past experience”, asked 
“to receive the fuel, manufactured from some other source of LEU”, after which 
they would “release their own stockpile of enriched uranium” (ElBaradei, 2011: 
307). This was to avoid waiting for a year for the other side to deliver the fuel. As a 
compromise, ElBaradei suggested that the IAEA would keep the Iranian LEU until 
the other side delivered their part. The fact that Iran also refused this possibility can 
be explained in terms of the polarization of Iranian domestic politics following the 
June 2009 election crisis, for now even moderates criticized the deal to damage 
Ahmadinejad (ElBaradei, 2011: 309).
When Iran subsequently began producing uranium enriched up to 20 percent on its 
own, the talks consequently focused on this activity and resulting stockpiles. In 
2012 and spring 2013, Iran was asked to give away or neutralize those stockpiles 
and to suspend enrichment up to 20 percent, and also to halt all activities at the 
underground Fordo enrichment plant - a facility which Iran built in secret during 
the nuclear crisis as an insurance against military threats from Israel and the US 
(Erästö, 2014). In return, the P5+1 offered to help Iran build a new light water reac-
tor; to deliver spare parts for its civilian airplanes; and, in the spring of 2013 at 
Almaty, Kazakhstan, to give modest relief from sanctions on trade in gold, metals 
and petrochemicals (Rozen, 9 June, 2013).
Iran viewed the above offers as imbalanced. As a former Iranian diplomat, Seyed 
Mousavian (2012: 191) explained at the time, the P5+1’s were asking ‘diamonds in 
return for peanuts’. An anonymous Iranian official, in turn, told the author in 
su mmer 2013 that the P5+1 2012 offer of spare parts and repairs for aircraft in 
exchange for Iranian nuclear concessions was “just crazy”. A document in the 
same official’s possession highlighted that the P5+1 were obliged under the NPT 
to deliver the elements that they were now offering as incentives. The document 
also noted that, in contrast to the strict demands made upon Iran, the wording of 
Western incentives was vague, serving to further “deepen the distrust and 
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uncertain ty on the Iranian side” (Erästö, 2014). Arguably, the most significant 
gestu re of confidence-building that was missing from the P5+1 proposals was the 
readiness to recognize Iran’s right to enrichment. This would have provided a 
crucial indication about where the diplomatic process was heading: in the absence 
of such recognition, Iran had reason to suspect that nothing had really changed 
and that the P5+1 would just push for further concessions without genuine 
re ciprocity.
Explaining the Success of the 2013 Interim Deal
There were, of course, several reasons for why the P5+1 refused to acknowledge 
Iran’s right to enrichment. First, this was a question of principle as such recogni-
tion went against the P5+1’s previous positions. Second, there was the persistent 
Western belief that coercion, rather than reciprocal concessions by the P5+1, would 
generate Iranian flexibility at the bargaining table. This belief reflects the asymme-
tric nature of the conflict: the Western position as the stronger party and the 
enforcer of law seemed to enable bargaining without significant concessions of 
their own. Third, there were formidable domestic obstacles in the US to explicitly 
accepting Iran’s right to enrich. As the former American member of the P5+1 nego-
tiating team, Robert Einhorn, explained to the author in summer 2013: “politically 
for the US it’s not very easy to accept a domestic enrichment program in Iran,” 
especially “before the Iranians had given any indication that they’re prepared to 
accept real limitations” to their program. He also expressed the concern that this 
might embolden Iran to claim “an unqualified right to enrichment”. At the same 
time, however, Einhorn explained that “[i]t’s coming to the point where it would 
be advisable to explain to the Iranians what the end state would be” and “give 
[them] an indication of where this is heading” (Erästö, 2014). As it turned out, this 
was precisely what happened in the next round of talks: as part of the agreement 
on the JPOA in November 2013, the parties outlined the contours of a comprehen-
sive deal, whereby the P5+1 explicitly stated their readiness to accept uranium 
enrichment in Iran. As indicated by Einhorn and another US official interviewed 
in summer 2013, this change of approach had to do with the acknowledgement 
that the previous P5+1 approach had not produced results (Erästö, 2014).
The JPOA can be seen as a result of learning on both sides. The preceding change in 
the P5+1 approach could be understood in terms of an adjustment in what Shmueli 
et al (2006: 212) call the ‘Power, social control, and conflict management frames’: as 
they argue, such frames are “amenable to shifts as stakeholders experience the 
failu re of unilateral, power-based approaches and the potential of collaborative 
ones”. On the Iranian side, the crucial change took place in the 2013 Presidential 
elections. The overwhelming victory of the moderate Rouhani reflected broad con-
sensus in Iran that the confrontational style of President Ahmadinejad was not 
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helping. The resulting change in Iran’s international image, in turn, made it easier 
for the US to justify its new approach and also to begin bilateral rapprochement 
with Iran. This process, together with the diplomatic efforts launched by the JPOA, 
has challenged many deeply-held negative assumptions on both sides. Most impor-
tantly, it has reinforced a positive reading of the situation, according to which at 
least the US administration seems to have prioritized non-proliferation over under-
mining the Iranian regime, and Iran might be more interested in nuclear self-suffi-
ciency than the development of nuclear weapons.
Remaining Pitfalls for Diplomacy
Despite the significant progress on confidence-building described above, the 
pr ocess of reaching a comprehensive agreement to the dispute over Iran’s nuclear 
program is still fraught with difficulties. Although exact details of the ongoing talks 
are not available at the time of writing, key issues of contention seem to be the level 
of enrichment in Iran, the timing of sanctions relief, as well as the duration of the 
comprehensive deal.
According to reports, Iran ultimately wants to have a large commercial enrichment 
program of 190 000 centrifuges but is prepared to accept the necessary transparency 
measures and safeguards, and also to keep enrichment to current levels (10,000 centri-
fuges) for nearly a decade. In line with the country’s long-term goal of self-sufficiency, 
these plans are based on the assumption that the country will be able to completely 
master fuel production by the time that the comprehensive agreement expires. How-
ever, as Einhorn notes, this might not be a realistic goal. He writes that the Ir anian 
expectation of being able to fabricate “highly specialized Bushehr fuel in such a short 
time period would be a huge technical challenge”, whereas Russian fuel is “the more 
economical and safer choice” (Einhorn, 2014). Russia has promi sed to provide the fuel 
to the functioning reactor at Bushehr at least until 2021, and for two additional reac-
tors until the end of their lifetime (Porter, 2014b), leaving Iran only with the limited 
need to produce its own LEU for a few research reactors.
At least for the duration of the comprehensive deal, the Obama administration has 
determined that it could live with a breakout time of maximum 6-12 months, on 
which basis it reportedly seeks to limit Iran’s current program to a few thousand 
centrifuges for two decades. During this time, Iran would continue to rely on 
Ru ssian fuel supplies. Interestingly, reports on the P5+1 positions normally do not 
refer to the time after the deal, leaving open the possibility that they could ulti-
mately accept an Iran with an industrial-scale enrichment capacity. However, this is 
unlikely as long as Western thinking continues to be governed by breakout times: 
as Einhorn (2014) notes, the kind of industrial-scale capacity that Iran aspires for 
would mean that it would be able to produce enough material for one nuclear 
bomb in only a few weeks.
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How valid are the current concerns on each side? The US focus on breakout times 
is based on the worst-case expectation that Iran will renege and embark on a crash 
program to produce a nuclear weapon. As argued in this article, this is an unlikely 
scenario. Even if one would find the interpretation of Iran’s intentions presented 
here unconvincing, it is clear that the transparency measures built in a comprehen-
sive deal would enable the early detection of any irregular activity by Iran, in which 
case the US and Israel would launch military action before Iran even had the time 
to build its first bomb. Reflective of the political nature of mistrust, the US and the 
rest of the international community has little concerns over Brazilian and Japanese 
enrichment programs over which they have much less oversight. The US position 
is therefore not understandable strictly from a non-proliferation perspective. 
Instead, it must be seen in terms of the need for consistency with previous posi-
tions, as well as an attempt to get the approval of allies and hardliners in the US 
Congress for a potential comprehensive deal.
As noted above, the Iranian position is also not completely logical, as the country 
will in any case continue to rely on Russian fuel at least in the near future. As far as 
the problem from the Iranian perspective has to do with the issue of holding on to 
current enrichment capacity, this would seem to be a position largely dictated by 
the need not to lose face domestically4. On the other hand, this position can be 
viewed as an insurance policy against uncertain future. After all, it is widely known 
that the P5+1’s ability to deliver their part of the deal is undermined by reluctance 
by the US Congress to lift the sanctions against Iran’s oil industry and Central Bank. 
Adding to Iran’s uncertainty is the P5+1’s apparent insistence to link the lifting of 
UN Security Council sanctions to the resolution in the IAEA process on PMDs, for 
there are no guarantees on how this process will end (Rauf and Kelley, 2014). If 
Iranian concessions were not reciprocated by sanctions relief, Iran would surely 
also back down from its commitments under any deal. This, in turn, could lead to 
unpredictable political circumstances, possibly also affecting Russo-Iranian nuclear 
cooperation. In such a situation, something close to the current enrichment capabi-
lity could provide Iran with leverage to ensure uninterrupted cooperation with 
Russia, and to continue the pursuit of nuclear self-sufficiency.
Conclusions
This article has sought to explain Iran’s insistence on maintaining its uranium enrich-
ment capacity mainly in terms of mistrust and prestige, with particular focus on the 
former. In addition, it has explained why, for the most part of the nuclear dispute, 
Iranian concerns were not fully appreciated in the West. On the one hand, the tenden cy 
4 Khamenei, on July 7, 2014, said that Iran needs 190,000 centrifuges in the long term. 
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to take the country’s nuclear weapons ambitions for granted seemin gly did away with 
the need to explore alternative explanations. There was also little reflection on the way 
in which previous Western actions—most notably the US policy of technology denial— 
influenced Iranian decisions. On the other hand, the lack of attention to Iranian con-
cerns can be explained in terms of the asymmetric nature of the conflict: by virtue of 
their role as Security Council permanent members, the P5 for a long time assumed 
they could simply coerce Iran into compliance with their demands.
For both sides, expecting the worst and framing the situation accordingly has seemed 
prudent both in terms of minimizing the risks inherent in disproving mistrust, and by 
helping to garner support for controversial policies. The problem with worst-case 
assessments, however, is not simply that they do not represent the whole picture, but 
they can also distort and shape reality by creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. Arguably 
based on awareness of related dangers, in later years of the crisis the parties have 
sought to adopt a more pragmatic approach by reducing ambiguity about their own 
goals and by giving the benefit of the doubt to the other side. The most crucial step in 
this regard was arguably taken in 2013, as the P5+1 recognized Iran’s right to enrich-
ment. The resulting diplomatic process has challen ged many deeply-held negative 
assumptions, suggesting that the conflict is not irreconcilable.
Although both sides have come a long way in addressing each other’s concerns, old 
thinking patterns continue to cast a shadow on the prospects of a comprehensive 
solution. As long as such solution is not reached, the danger of a relapse to mu tually 
reinforcing negative dynamics remains. This article associated much of remaining 
pitfalls for diplomacy with domestic politics in the US and Iran. These key dispute 
parties feel the pressure of appearing consistent with their previous positions. On 
the one hand this is a question of principle, but on the other hand based on practical 
considerations: If the P5+1 appear to give up too much, they will not get the neces-
sary support for the deal from the US Congress and Israel. The fact that such sup-
port is far from guaranteed in any case can be seen to add to the Iranian reluctance 
to cut down its centrifuges, as they can be an insurance against an uncertain future.
What, then, are the prospects for a comprehensive deal? Compromise on centrifuge 
numbers should not be impossible to solve because positions on either side do not 
reflect any immediate concerns. The issue of sanctions relief, however, seems 
proble matic. As the US Congress might seek to undermine any deal, it would be 
advisable to start sanctions relief from Security Council resolutions, as this is not 
dependent on Congress approval. Given the uncertainties with PMD issue and its 
irrelevance for the future, this process should be dissociated from UN sanctions. 
Iranian cooperation in response to the lifting of UN sanctions and those US sanc-
tions under executive power could ultimately pave the way for removing oil and 
Central Bank sanctions even without Congressional opposition, for Europeans 
could always withdraw their support for them.
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